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ABSTRACT  
This study investigates the impact of bank-level and macroeconomic variables on bank 
fragility using a dynamic two-step GMM panel estimator on 433 banks in 46 African 
countries over the period 1997–2012. The study finds that both bank characteristics and 
macroeconomic variables are key drivers of bank fragility. The past experience of higher 
levels of non-performing loans (NPLs) significantly and positively determines current 
levels of NPLs. The growth of gross loan is negative and significant but economic growth 
leads to higher NPLs. The equity to assets ratio and the log of assets of banks are 
negatively associated with NPLs suggesting their potential to provide buffers to banks. 
Equally, total assets reduce bank fragility. These findings have important policy 
implications. The study shows that credit risk management initiatives, bank operation 
oversight and regulations should not be restricted in the times of financial crises, even 
during positive economic growth episodes in the business cycle. 
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The assets of banks and other characteristics along with the macroeconomic reality 
prevailing in a given country, growing financial liberalisation, integration into global 
financial markets, advances in technology and innovation, a rapid development of new 
financial products and increasing competition in the banking sector pose significant 
challenges to financial stability. The recent global financial crisis, which originated in the 
US, was preceded by a high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) such that substantial 
bail-outs have had to be invoked to avoid any further dramatic collapse of banks.1  
The trend in NPLs has led to the collapse of some African banks in recent years. 
The problem of bad debts in African banks and elsewhere has been a long standing 
problem for credit risk management teams. Hence, it is important to investigate 
determinants of non-performing loans by using both bank-specific and country-specific 
macro variables. Some studies are focus on a single country (e.g. Abid et al., 2014). 
Fofack (2005) examined the main factors behind high NPLs in Sub-Saharan African 
countries during the 1990s and uncovers a strong association between NPLs and 
economic growth, real exchange rate appreciation, real interest rates, interbank loans and 
net interest margins. The findings highlight the importance of micro and macro-specific 
determinants. However, the most important driving factors behind NPLs accumulation in 
Africa relate to macroeconomic volatility such as the deterioration of terms of trade. Our 
study covers numerous African countries and a large number of banks using recent data 
from Bankscope and other databases to account for economy wide effects such as 
movements in the business cycle as captured by the growth of gross domestic product 
(GDP).  
                                                          
1 See Koutsomanoli-Filippaki (2009); Moshirian (2008) and Tropeano (2010).  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will review the relevant literature on 
NPLs followed by method of analysis in Section 3. Section 4 provides important details 
of the nature of the data while section 5 discusses the results. Finally, we conclude the 
paper with potential policy implications on the basis of the preceding analyses.  
 
2. Related literature  
Using a global database of banks, Iftikhar (2015) has made an important study of bank 
fragility by examining a range of determining factors such as bank level characteristics, 
macroeconomic environment, financial reform and bank regulatory or supervision 
indicators. The study found the significant role that bank specific, macro and financial 
reform variables play in NPLs. In the current study, we could not control for financial 
reform and regulatory environments due to the lack of data on those variables. Hence, our 
review of the relevant empirical literature focuses on the studies that primarily focus on 
the effect of bank specific and/or macroeconomic variables on NPLs.  
Kane and Rice (2001) argue that banking stress depends on the information 
environment and on the effectiveness of government efforts to regulate/supervise and 
guarantee bank solvency. Information asymmetry (moral hazard on bank owners and 
adverse selection on borrowers) is a key factor in bank runs and financial distress in much 
of Africa. Reducing informational asymmetry has an impact on growth (Murinde, 2012; 
Ncube and Senbet, 1995). Guy and Lowe (2011) who examine the problem of NPLs in 
the Barbadian banking system by using bank and macroeconomic variables during the 
period 1996-2010 and find that both bank-specific and macro variables are crucial to 
understanding the behaviour of NPLs. Various macroeconomic shocks are applied to the 
Barbadian banking sector and it is found that high NPLs are associated with different 
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macroeconomic stresses.2 Shehzad et al (2010) used data on 500 banks from more than 
50 countries during 2005-2007 and found that foreign ownership concentration has a 
negative effect on banks’ NPLs but only if the share of ownership is more than 50%. The 
findings illustrate the importance of non-linearities in the empirical analysis of fragility 
because some explanatory variables will have effect only after a certain threshold is 
achieved.  
In the same way, along with bank specific variables another strand of the literature 
has also highlighted the relationship between macroeconomic variables and NPLs. The 
size, composition and independence of bank board members is critical to the performance 
of banks, to avoid conflict of interests and agency problem. In Africa, many banks have 
politicians and former military officials in their boards (e.g. Kenya and Nigeria). Thus, 
there is no separation of ownership and control (Ncube, 2012). If the interest of board 
members dictates the decision making process of banks, lending might be reckless and 
may go to favoured groups. From a policy point of view, the previous of the infiltration 
of bank boards by special interest groups should be given significant attention by 
regulatory authorities who are seeking financial stability and effective banks’ 
management in the African context. Lack of separation of bank ownership and control 
will increase the probability of bad debt and bank distress.  
Louzis et al (2012) examined the influence of macro variables on NPLs in the 
Greek banking sector using panel data. They argued that NPLs can be explained by 
macroeconomic variables such as real GDP growth, unemployment, interest rates and 
public debt and found strong effects of these macroeconomic variables on NPLs. Their 
findings suggested that management quality and inefficiency may be important indicators 
                                                          
2 Another study by Salas and Saurina (2002) includes both microeconomic and macroeconomic variables 
as determinants of NPLs in the Spanish banking system. They also suggested that any future changes in 
NPLs can be highly identified by bank-specific variables more in saving than commercial banks. 
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for predicting future NPLs. Festic et al (2011) studied five new European Union (EU) 
member states and revealed that the amount of available finance and credit growth may 
impair banking performance and worsen nonperforming loans due to overheating of 
economies. Similarly, Espinoza et al (2010) studied the link between macroeconomic 
variables and NPLs of 80 banks in the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) countries. They 
suggested that high rates of NPLs are generally attributed to high interest rates and 
adverse macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, other studies, for example Boudriga et al 
(2010a and 2010b); Berge and Boye (2007); Rinaldi and Sanchis (2006); and Ranjan and 
Dhal (2003) incorporated macroeconomic determinants as explanatory variables of NPLs.  
Shen and Chen (2008) also used GDP growth in his paper and found that growth has a significant 
negative effect on NPLs. 
Surprisingly, only few studies investigate the effect of bank specific and country specific 
variables jointly on NPLs. Our paper considers both bank-specific (micro) and macro 
variables and their effect on financial fragility which is defined as the ratio of impaired 
loans to gross loans.  
 
3. The econometric framework  
As stated above, the main objective of this study is to estimate bank specific and macro 
level variable enhance or impede the extent and probability of bank/financial fragility in 
Africa. Here, financial fragility (FF) is the LHS variable which is regressed on the 
relevant micro (Y) and macro (X) variables. Hence, we have the following general 
functional set up as a starting point; 
FF = f (Y, X)                       (1) 
7 
 
Basing on equation (1), we specify a dynamic model of financial fragility by introducing 
a lagged dependent variable of FF. This variable accounts for state/path dependence in 
NPL accumulation and its inclusion justifies the adoption of the dynamic panel GMM 
estimation technique (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998) as reflected in 
equations (2). This inclusion of the lag of the dependent variable renders the OLS 
estimation technique inconsistent and biased. To address the potential problem of 
endogeniety that is introduced due to the lagged LHS variable and the possibility of 
correlation between any right hand side variable of the model with error term (ξ i,j,t) of 
bank i, country j and year/time t, we adopted a dynamic two-step system GMM panel 
estimator technique instead of one-step GMM. This is due to the fact that dynamic two-
step system GMM is asymptotically more efficient and suitable for analysis than one-
step.3 We employ the Windmijer (2005) finite sample correction (which provides WC-
robust standard errors) to compensate for the downward biased in standard errors 
generated by two-step GMM estimates. In the Blundell and Bond GMM estimator, there 
is no correlation between the difference of disturbance term (∆ξ i,j,t) of the model and the 
higher order lags of level variables. Similarly, the disturbance term (ξ i,j,t)  is not correlated 
with the lag difference of these variables. The assumption of moment conditions in the 
two-step GMM are applicable for each t. The basic intuition of the Blundell and Bond 
estimator is that the lagged values of the regressor are used as instruments for right hand 
side variables. In addition, by taking first differences, the unobserved fixed effects are 
eliminated in the estimating equation and the regression in levels and in first differences 
are estimated simultaneously. Along with the Sargan test statistic, we report statistics 
related to first-order autoregression [AR (1) or] and second-order autoregression [i.e.AR 
                                                          
3 Baltagi (2001) documented that in a dynamic relationship, fixed effect or random effect estimation 
techniques provide biased and inconsistent estimates, particularly when N is quite larger than T; normally 
a fixed and random effect estimation technique applies in a static relationship. 
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(2)] to gauge the presence of serial correlation in disturbance term (ξ i,k,t). It is assumed 
that ξ i,k,t in Blundell and Bond’s estimator is an independent idiosyncratic error term, so 
as a technical requirement the first order AR (1) test should reject the null hypothesis (Ho 
= No Autocorrelation), while the second order AR (2) test should not reject the hypothesis 
of no or zero correlation. Identification is an important consideration in the presence of 
lagged dependent varaibles and conventionally, the Sargan test of over-identifying 
restriction is used to test the validity of the instruments in the model. If the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected under Sargan, it suggests that over-identifying restrictions or 
instruments used are valid.  
In equation (2), we introduce financial reform as the main explanatory variable 
and analyze its impact on financial fragility. Thus, in order to estimate the financial 
fragility of banks, we consider the standard model used in empirical studies (See Louzis et 
al, 2012; Merkl and Stolz, 2009; and Salas and Saurina, 2002).  A dynamic panel variant of the 
model is specified in the following way:  
FF i, j, t = α0 + α1FF i, j, (t-1) + α2Y i, j, t + α3 X j, t  +µ  i, j  +  ξ i ,j, t                         (2) 
where FF i, j, t is the financial fragility indicator of  bank i in country j at time t. FF i, j, t-1 
is its lagged value and is entered to capture the speed of adjustment to a steady state/ 
equilibrium level. Yi, j, t denotes a vector of bank-specific micro variables (i.e. bank 
efficiency, equity to assets ratio, the lag value of growth of gross loans and log of total 
assets); X j, t represents a vector of the macroeconomic variables (i.e. real GDP growth, 
GDP deflator and the unemployment rate); µ i, j  controls the variant behaviour of fixed 
characteristics of banks (or bank heterogeneity) and ξ i, j, t is the independently and 
identically distributed (iid) disturbance term, which contains all factors that cannot be 




4.  Data   
In this paper micro-panel data of 433 banks in 46 African countries has been used over 
the period 1997-2012.  The total raw data from these countries during the sample period 
1997 to 2012 contains 2484 observations from 539 banks. After making data checks, and 
re-examining data issues such as missing observation, inconsistencies and reporting 
errors of data, the final data set used for estimation consists of 1840 observations that 
includes 433 individual-banks. 
The data of bank-specific and macroeconomics-specific variables come from 
different sources. The data on bank-specific variables such as: Bank/Financial Fragility 
(proxied by Impaired Loans to Gross Loan), Bank Size (proxy of Total Assets), Growth 
of Gross Loans, Bank Capital (proxy of Equity to Asset Ratio) and Bank Efficiency 
(proxy of Cost to Income Ratio) has been collected from the Orbis (Bank-scope) database 
maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van Dijk, which is a key data source for financial 
fragility studies. Similarly, the data on macroeconomics variables, namely GDP growth 
and GDP deflator has been taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database 
maintained by the World Bank. Lastly, the outliers from the data set are removed in order 
to reduce their potential biased effect on estimated coefficients.   
4.1.  Financial Fragility 
“In macroeconomics, the term financial fragility is used loosely to refer to a financial 
system’s susceptibility to large-scale financial crises caused by small routine shocks” 
(Lagunoff and Schreft, 2001:220). In this paper the ratio of impaired loans to gross loan 
(i.e. the accounting term for NPLs) is used as a proxy for financial fragility.  The ratio of 
impaired loans to gross loans based on the amount of loans which are classified by banks 
as impaired or doubtful. The lower the value of the ratio, the better the asset quality or 
vice versa. In related work, Iftikhar (2015), Shehzad et al (2010) and Shen and Chen 
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(2008) also employed NPLs as a proxy of banking fragility to measure the riskiness of 
banks.  
4.2.  Bank size 
To examine the effect of the size of bank on financial fragility, the log of total assets is 
included in the model. The sign of bank size is expected to be negative on financial 
fragility because big size banks are more capable or equipped in credit risk management 
strategies, and have enough resources to deal with defaulters. While, Mishkin (2006) and 
Kane (2000) documented that the “too big to fail” effect in large size of banks can also 
be the main reason of higher risk taking. 
4.3.  Bank capital 
To measure the level of banks’ capitalisation, the equity to asset ratio has been used. This 
ratio also indicates the bank’s capability and credit worthiness to compensate any kind of 
losses. The higher equity to asset ratio, the stronger banks capitalisation which suggests 
stronger security of banks and lower likelihood of bank defaults.   
4.4.  Growth of gross loans 
Using the growth of gross loan, we examine the riskiness of banks in African countries. 
If this growth rate indicates excessive loan growth in the economy (e.g. due to over-
inflationary effects), it can be a symptom of deteriorating underwriting standards.  We 
expect that loan growth leads to increased probability of financial fragility in the short 
run. Hence, the lag value of loan growth is included in the regression to assess the impact 
of speed of growth of gross loan on likelihood of building NPLs. Finding of previous 
studies suggest that the relation between financial fragility and loan growth is positive, 
because rapid loan growth and a possible decline in loan quality during contractionary 
time could deteriorate the monitoring and evaluating ability of banks which leads to 
enhance the size of bad debts (see Clair, 1992).  
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4.5. Bank efficiency 
Cost to income ratio is used as a proxy of bank efficiency to measures the efficiency and 
overheads of the respective banks. The lower (higher) the ratio, the better (worse) the 
efficiency, which suggested that efficient and well organized banking system could 
reduce the likelihood of loan default.  
4.6. Macroeconomic variables 
Number of existing studies in banking and finance literature has used macro-specific 
determinants to examine their impact on financial fragility. The finding of these studies 
show that financial fragility is closely associated with the health of the macroeconomy. 
For instance, Salas and Surina (2002); Fofack (2005) and Espinoza and Prasad (2010) 
used GDP growth rate and real GDP per capita growth, respectively. Their finding 
revealed that unfavourable macroeconomic conditions or recession phase worsen the 
banking sector performance by increasing the amount of non-performing loans (NPLs).  
 
5. Discussion of results  
5.1. Descriptive statistics  
The summary statistics of our variables is provided in table 1 below. All variables are in 
percentage terms except log of total assets, which is in millions of USD. The mean value 
of the financial fragility is estimated to be 11.7 % and ranges from 0 to 150%. The average 
ratio of impaired loans to gross loans is very high in Africa by international standards 
(Baltagi, et al 2011). Particularly the upper limit of this ratio given by the maximum value 
reported in the tables is much higher than an international average of about 86.9% 
reported in Iftikhar (2015). This points to the need to pay careful attention to the 
accumulation of bad debts in African banks. The average of the log of total assets is 5.78 
million USD which is lower than the international average of about 6.14 million USD, 
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the variable ranging from -3.72 to 12.21 million USD. The growth of gross loans is 
34.97% which is much higher than the global average 18.72% calculated by Iftikhar 
(2015). This indicates the higher pace of accumulation of doubtful loans in Africa 
increasing the likelihood of bank fragility happening. Similarly, the average ratio of 
equity to assets is around is 14.2% compared to a global figure of 17.01% including the 
lower capitalization rates prevailing in African banks. The mean value of cost to income 
ratio is 62% approximately and this does not compare well with the international level of 
CIR which is 57.1%.  Since cost to income ratio was used as a proxy for bank efficiency, 
the higher rates of CIR in African banks indicates their relative inefficiency relative to 
their international peers. In addition to the bank-specific variables, we have two 
macroeconomic variables. The mean growth rate of GDP is 4.72% indicating the healthy 
macroeconomic economic growth in Africa in recent years (esp. since 2000) as far as 
GDP is concerned.  The average rate of the GDP deflator is 228.65 and ranges from 0 to 
3868.3.  This variable is an annual indicator of the GDP implicit deflator which is the 
ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. The base year 
varies by country. It reflects price changes for total GDP. As the most general measure of 
the overall price level, it accounts for changes in government consumption, capital 
formation (including inventory appreciation), international trade, and the main 
component, household final consumption expenditure.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics of key variables4  
Variable  Mean  Std dev Min  Max  N  
Financial Fragility 
(%) 
11.66  14.1 0  150  2484 
Growth of gross loan 
(%) 
34.97 64.36 -78.67 952.42 2484 
Equity to Asset 
Ratio (%) 
14.16 12.93 -179.2 99.86 2484 
Log of total assets 
(Million USD) 
5.78 1.87 -3.73 12.2 2484 
Cost-to-Income 
Ratio (%) 
62.04 27.31 4.4 372.1 2484 
Growth of GDP (%) 4.72 3.73 -16.9 37.9 2484 
GDP Deflator  228.65 401.42 0 3868.3 2484 
 
In addition to the above summary statistics, we also examine the correlation 
between the bank fragility variable and the explanatory variables. The results indicate that 
all the correlations are statistically significant at the 5% level. It is important to note that 
the correlation between the growth of gross loan, log of total assets, cost-to-income ratio 
and financial fragility are relatively stronger than the correlations with other explanatory 
variables. The pair-wise correlation matrix also explains that the growth of gross loans, 
the log of total assets, equity to assets ratio and growth of gross domestic product (GDP) 
                                                          
44 The details of the names of the countries and bank characteristics by country can be obtained from the 
authors upon request.   
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are negatively correlated with financial fragility while the correlations between financial 
fragility and cost-to-income ratio is positive. 
 
5.2. Effect of micro and macro variables on bank fragility in Africa  
The dynamic GMM coefficient estimates of fragility of 433 African banks in 46 countries 
for the period 1997 to 2012 are given in tables 2. The equity to assets ratio and lagged 
value of financial fragility are treated as endogenous variables whereas the bank 
efficiency variable is treated as predetermined variable, meaning that “GMM style” 
instruments are used. The lagged dependent variable and bank efficiency variable are 
instrumented by their lags in all regressions. The results of Wald chi square and the p-
values of the Sargan test and AR (2) are significant at least at 5% level, which suggests 
that the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying instruments and  the presence of 2nd 
order serial correlation [(i.e. AR (2)] cannot be rejected. These diagnostic tests provide 
evidence of the appropriateness/validity of instruments used. 
 
Table 2 reports the results based on the estimation of equation 1, in which financial 
fragility has been regressed on bank-specific and macro-specific variables. The lagged 
dependent variable is positive and highly significant at the 1% level. This means bank 
fragility is state dependence or the fragility of the banking system in the previous year (t-
1) exacerbates current bank/financial fragility (t). The equity to assets ratio and log of 
total assets have coefficients that are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level 
respectively. The findings on theses variables show that an increase in bank capital stock 
and size of banks reduces the chance of financial fragility by -0.41 and -7.96 percentage 
points, respectively. The result of the log of total assets is also consistent with the findings 
of Salas and Saurina (2002) and Fernandez de Lis et al. (2000) who found a negative 
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relationship between bank size and NPLs. This suggests that bigger banks provide more 
diversification opportunities. The coefficient of growth of gross loans is negative and 
significant at the 10% level, which implies that high growth of loans reduces fragility of 
banks. This is unexpected and contrasts with the findings of Espinoza and Prasad, 2010). 
An interesting observation is the result pertaining to the speed of growth of the size of the 
macroeconomy as captured by the growth of GDP. There is a positive and significant 
association between economic growth and bank fragility. Though unexpected it is 
plausible to say that financial difficulties of banks are not only observed during economic 
decline, but they can also be experienced during times of boom as demonstrated in our 
finding. Therefore, credit risk management and careful assessment of the health of the 
financial system should not be ignored when economies are on the positive growth 
trajectory.      
 
Table 2: Dynamic panel estimation of fragility in African banks 
Variables Coefficient 
 (WC-Robust standard error) 
Financial fragility(t-1) 
      0. 451*** 
 (0. 083) 
Cost to income ratio 
0. 042       
 (0.028) 
Equity to assets ratio(t-1) 
    -0. 410***  
 (0. 174) 
Growth of gross loans 
      -0. 019*   
(0. 010) 
Log of total assets 
  -7.954     
(2. 865) 
Growth of GDP  
0.224** 
(0. 112) 
GDP implicit deflator 
-0.011      
(0. 081) 
No. of banks 433 
Wald Chi square (p-value) 
188.2 
 (0.00) 





AR(1) test statistic (p-value) 
-3.86                         
(0.00) 




The dependent variable is financial fragility, which is considered as a proxy of impaired loans to gross 
loans. Equity to assets ratio and lagged value of impaired loans to gross loans are treated as endogenous. 
The lagged dependent variable is instrumented by its lagged value. Cost to income ratio treated as 
predetermine variable and instrumented by its lagged value. All regressions include a full set of time 
dummies but results are not reported in the table. Figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors 
obtained by the Windmeijer WC-robust estimator. 
 
(***) Coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
(**)   Coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
(*)     Coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The recent waves of banking crises globally and the collapse of some African banks have 
been predominantly attributed to a high ratio of loan default. The purpose of this study is 
to explore the impact of micro and macro-economic factors on bank/financial fragility in 
Africa. We examined the key drivers of financial fragility of 46 African countries using 
bank-level data for a sample of 433 banks during the period 1997-2012. We found that 
the financial vulnerability of banking sector is significantly affected both by bank-specific 
and macro-specific variables. Bank size and capitalization are critical to maintain a 
healthy financial system in the continent. The importance of keeping a supervisory 
oversight on banks at times when there is a positive economic growth should not be 
emphasized enough. The results of this paper indicate that credit risk management and 
careful assessment of the health of the financial system should not be ignored when 
economies are on the positive growth trajectory. Ex-post treatment of financial fragility 
should not be the norm. For effective supervision, control and management of banks, 
policy makers should plan for rainy days when times are good. This is because the 
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regression results highlight the increase in NPLs during positive macroeconomic 
episodes. Related research pointed out that strong and sound banking regulation and 
supervision have an inverse relationship with financial fragility (Iftikhar, 2015). We 
believe that the problem of accumulation of NPLs in Africa could be mitigated greatly if  
1)  the banking system of African countries implement effective and sound international 
practices that affect banking supervision and regulation policies to ensure the financial 
stability; 2) transparent and accountable systems are installed in place to improve 
screening and monitoring clients that can enable banks to have some control over the 
thorny issues of moral hazard and adverse selection (asymmetric information) (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1983),  and m; 3) if policy makers show commitment to eliminate the 
influence of politically exposed personalities (PEPs) in bank boards, ownership and 
operations to limit state capture or rent-seeking behavior;  ; and 4) if providing adequate 
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